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Introduction 
The subject of this paper is women experiencing male partner violence and the determination 
of refugee status.
1
  My central point of departure is the changes that were made in the new 
Swedish Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716) in 2006 concerning the definition of ‘refugee’. The 
significance of these changes is that persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of their gender or sexual orientation and who, according to previous legislation, were 
granted protection as ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’, are now regarded as refugees 
under the United Nations Refugee Convention.
2
 The changes were made in the light of, inter 
alia, guidelines issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
These guidelines were made in view of a longstanding recognition that women historically 
have been particularly disadvantaged by the Refugee Convention.
3
 Women have also been 
underrepresented for many years among refugees in Western countries of asylum. This is the 
case in Sweden,
4
 as well as in other ‘developed countries’.5 The global picture seems to be 
that women are left behind in refugee camps, while men fight, are imprisoned, killed or flee 
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4
 http://www.migrationsverket.se/, accessed 7 November 2011. 
5
 Bhabha, J., Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 2004, No. 2, pp. 227–243, on pp. 232 f.  
Nilsson  Persecution on Account of One’s Gender 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2 
 
to the West.
6
 The predominance of males among asylum seekers is, however, starting to 
change. According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) globalization has 
brought with it a ‘feminization of migration’,7 including an increase in the numbers of 
women seeking asylum independently of their families.
8
 The opinion that it is more difficult 
for women to be granted refugee status has, however, also been questioned in recent years. 
Statistics from a number of countries suggest rather that women are favoured in the 
determination of refugee status.
9
 In Sweden too, women are granted refugee status to a 
greater extent than men, according to statistics from the Swedish Migration Board. There 
may be ‘valid’ reasons for this difference. For instance, migration patterns where the man is 
seeking asylum alone and is followed by the rest of the family, may have an effect on 
statistics in a way that seems to favour women.
10
 According to studies from other countries, 
‘derivative persecution’ of female asylum seekers on the basis of their family membership is 
more readily accepted by decision makers than direct persecution, where the claimant has to 
establish that she has suffered or fears persecution on a particular Convention ground.
11
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7
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8
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of refugees and asylum-seekers. See UNHCR, Global Trends 2010, 20 June 2011, p. 2, also available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html, accessed 7 November 2011. 
9
 Bhabha, 2004, pp. 231 and 236 f. See also Spijkerboer, T., Gender and Refugee Status, Ashgate 2002, p. 103 
and Mascini & Bochove, 2009, p. 113, with further references. 
10
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Marginalized Recourse in Swedish Asylum Law?], Juridisk Tidskrift 2005-06, pp. 834–865, on p. 852. 
According to a study of data from the Dutch INS, when controlling for such factors, men even had a slightly 
greater success rate than women, although this effect was not significant. However, this success rate only 
concerned the category of ‘successful’ asylum seekers. In the category of ‘unsuccessful’ asylum seekers, men 
still had a considerably smaller chance of obtaining a residence permit than women. Their findings suggest that 
men fit the image of a calculating, ‘bogus’ refugee in more respects while female asylum seekers more closely 
match the image of a ‘victim of patriarchal domination’. Accordingly, ‘gender biases’ can also be detrimental to 
male applicants. See Mascini & van Bochove, 2009, particularly on pp. 119 and 127 f. 
11
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Review in the Dutch Asylum System, in Noll, G. (Ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in 
Asylum Procedures, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2005, pp. 67–102, on p. 19. 
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Furthermore, it seems that married applicants can expect a higher likelihood of approval than 
singles.
12
  
Available statistics in Sweden suggest that children are favoured in determining asylum, in 
comparison with adults. In contrast to the statistical analyses, Swedish qualitative studies, 
however, show that children are evidentially absent from investigations and decisions and 
that the asylum determination process in matters concerning families is primarily concerned 
with the father’s grounds for seeking asylum.13 The qualitative studies that have been carried 
out to date concerning female asylum-seekers suggest that this is also the case when women 
seek asylum. Hence, in a press release attached to a report
14
 published by the Red Cross about 
the investigation and assessment of protection needs for women, it was noted that the study 
reveals ‘gender biases’, and that there is ‘a big gap between the legislation and the reality that 
asylum-seeking women face today in Sweden’ [my translation].15 Moreover, the Swedish 
Refugee Advice Centre issued a press release and also published an online debate article in 
connection with the publication of a handbook for a fair asylum determination process,
16
 
which was precipitated by an examination of documents governing the process, concluding 
that gender equality does not seem to be favoured in the policy area of asylum,
17
 while it is a 
commonly observed feature in other policy areas.
18
 Similar observations have been made in a 
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p. 269. 
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 See Juhlén, K., Barns egna asylskäl [Children’s Own Reasons for Asylum], Rädda barnen, Stockholm 2003, 
p. 19 and Nilsson, E., Barn i rättens gränsland. Om barnperspektiv vid prövning om uppehållstillstånd 
[Children in the Borderland of Law. On Child Perspectives in the Determination of Granting Residence 
Permits], Iustus Förlag, Uppsala 2007, p. 235. Concerning applications before the 2006 revision, see Bexelius, 
M., Kvinnor på flykt – en analys av svensk asylpolitik ur ett genusperspektiv 1997-2000 [Women on the Run—
An Analysis of the Swedish Asylum Policy from a Gender Perspective 1997-2000], Rådgivningsbyrån för 
asylsökande och flyktingar, Stockholm 2001. 
14
 Zamacona Aguirre, M., Riktlinjer för utredning och bedömning av kvinnors skyddsbehov – Ett fungerande 
verktyg? [Guidelines for the Investigation and Assessment of Women’s Need for Protection—A Working 
Tool?], Svenska Röda Korset 2008. 
15
 Published 30 November 2008. Available at http://www.redcross.se/pressrum/rapporter-och-
dokument/?itemid=3168, accessed 7 November 2011. 
16
 Bexelius, M., Asylrätt, kön och politik. En handbok för jämställdhet och kvinnors rättigheter [Asylum Law, 
Gender and Politics. A Handbook for Equality and Women’s Rights], Rådgivningsbyrån för asylsökande och 
flyktingar, Stockholm 2008. 
17
Bexelius, M., Sundquist, A., Kvinnors rättigheter är mänskliga rättigheter, Dagens Arena 19 March 2008.. See 
also http://sweref.org/kvinnor/ny_handbok_publicerad.aspx, accessed 7 November 2011. 
18
 As described by Yttergren, Å., in this issue, a commonly observed feature of Sweden is its high level of 
gender equality, which is correlated to its institutionalized welfare. 
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recent study published by the UNHCR.
19
 This critique raises questions about the basis of 
equality between women and men in the determination of refugee status in Sweden: what 
values, notions, assumptions or ‘systems conditions’ do the 2006 revision rest upon? 
I have identified three parallel but sometimes conflicting trends within the area of Swedish 
migration law, each of which is characterized by recent change. The first trend emphasizes 
rule of law ideals and problems concerning the politicization of migration law. Change in this 
area is towards the ‘juridification’ of migration law. The new Swedish Aliens Act that came 
into force in 2006 can be viewed as an expression of such a change. It involves a change from 
matters being dealt with by administrative authorities and the Government to a system where 
appeals are tried in administrative courts. These changes were made in order to strengthen the 
‘rule of law’, defined in the preparatory work as requiring ‘uniformity’ and ‘predictability’.20 
The second trend is centered on ‘the globalization threat’ and the ‘feminization of migration’, 
which I have already mentioned. In this area we see further changes towards restrictive 
immigration and refugee policies. The third trend is based on the experiences of women who 
are excluded by bureaucratic and legal practices for determining refugee status. As I have 
already indicated, in this area we have recently seen a change towards greater inclusion, at 
least at the level of formal statements in the law. The net result of these changes is not a more 
inclusive attitude towards migrant women but, as I will argue, a highly restrictive system with 
an inbuilt structural discrimination against migrant women on the basis of gender, race and 
class.  
The first three sections of this paper are structured around these ‘movements’.  The first 
section starts with an analysis of the general provisions governing the determination of 
refugee status and the changes that were introduced by the new act, as well as the ‘special’ 
traits of migration law. In the second section, these ‘special traits’ are considered in relation 
to the ‘globalization threat’: in this context we see a politicization of the process, rather than 
the ‘rule of law’. These parts of the paper serve to locate the legislative changes concerning 
‘persecution on account of gender’ in the overall context of migration law which is 
                                              
19
 Feijen, L., Frennmark, E., Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning. En studie av Migrationsverkets utredning av och 
beslut om internationellt skydd [Quality in the Asylum Determination Process. A Study About the Migration 
Board’s Investigations and Decisions on International Protection, UNHCR 2011, pp. 113 f. and 142 f. 
20
 See Prop. 2004/05:170, Ny instans- och processordning i utlännings- och medborgarskapsärenden 
[Government’s Proposal, New Order of Instance and Process in Aliens and Citizenship Matters], pp. 108 and 
394. 
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considered in the third section. A more detailed account and critique of these changes is 
provided in the fourth section. Finally, in the last part of the paper, my conclusions are 
presented. 
 
General provisions for determining status – the ‘special’ traits of migration law  
In international legal doctrine it has been observed that migration laws are ‘special’ in many 
respects. According to Dauvergne they are typically marked by high degrees of discretion, 
maintaining a fixed and law-like appearance while being simultaneously infinitely malleable. 
She points out, however, that this is starting to change; migration laws are now being imbued 
with more of a ‘rule of law’ character.21 The new Swedish Aliens Act can be viewed as an 
expression of such a change. Yet, the Act is still marked by demands other than those usually 
required when providing for the ‘rule of law’. Hence, regarding the general provisions of the 
proceedings it can be noted first that the order of instance in migration matters differs from 
what is normal in administrative court proceedings in Sweden: in normal administrative 
matters the highest court is the Supreme Administrative Court, whereas in migration matters 
the highest court is one step lower – the Administrative Court of Appeal. In justifying this 
divergence the Government alleged that one aspect of the ‘rule of law’ in these matters is that 
it must not take too long for a decision to gain legal force, as there are serious consequences 
of long waiting times in the asylum process.
22
 Secondly, grounds for appeal are more limited 
than in the ordinary administrative process. The justification for this limitation, according to 
the Government, was the basic demand that the new order should deal with matters 
speedily.
23
 
Despite the introduction of new orders of instance and process, by which administrative 
authorities and the Government were replaced by a system where appeals are tried in 
administrative courts, the Government retains a considerable influence on applications. This 
is because of its powers to issue regulations: the constitution in the area of migration law 
                                              
21
 Dauvergne, C., Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for Migration and Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 7 f. 
22
 Prop. 2004/05:170, p. 109.  
23
 Prop. 2004/05:170, p. 132. 
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allows the Parliament to delegate competence to the Government in matters that ought 
otherwise to be regulated in legislation. This can also be understood in terms of the need for 
‘speed’ and ‘flexibility’; migration law being an area of law where it is assumed that the 
Government must have immediate control, because of the perceived threat of masses of 
asylum-seekers crossing our borders.
24
  
The technical formulation of the legislation can be said to be very much of a framework 
character, which means that it allows extensive scope for assessing the circumstances in each 
case. The Swedish Council of Legislation objected to this feature on the basis that several of 
the substantive rules needed to be further concretized in order to be applied by courts, to 
create conditions for a reasonably uniform and foreseeable application.
25
 However, the 
Government was of the opinion that the substantive rules were ‘sufficiently adjusted’ to allow 
trial in courts. As justification for this, the Government stated that the intention of the 
investigation (on which the proposed bill was based) was that the ‘rule of law’, ‘uniformity’ 
and ‘predictability’, would be provided through the specifications that had been made 
concerning ‘the most important basis’ for forming a judgement.26  
Migration law can thus be understood as a particularly politicized area of law, because of the 
continuing interference by the Government as well as the technical formulation of the 
legislation and the emphasis on speed and flexibility. Even the ‘rule of law’, in this branch of 
law, is defined in such terms. Accordingly, the ‘special’ character of migration law implies 
demands different from those usually required when providing for the ‘rule of law’; 
globalization and the threat of ‘illegal’ migrants seeking asylum being the key point, bringing 
with it restriction of refugee law while expanding refugee rhetoric.
27
 
                                              
24
 For similar observations in international doctrine, see Dauvergne, 2008, pp. 47 f. In the construction of 
asylum-seekers as a threat, there is also security concerns related to the events of September 11, 2001. See 
Dauvergne, C., Security and Migration Law in the Less Brave New World, 16 Social & Legal Studies 2007, No. 
4, pp. 533–549, particularly on pp. 534 and 540 f., with further references. See also Goodwin-Gill, G. S., 
McAdam, J., The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York 2007, p. 416. 
25
 Lagrådets yttrande över lagrådsremiss den 17 mars 2005, Utdrag ur protokoll vid sammanträde 2005-05-09 
[Council on Legislation, Opinion on Proposal Referred to the Council on Legislation for Consideration the 17
th
 
of March 2005, Transcript from Protocol at Session 090505], pp. 9 f. 
26
 Prop. 2004/05:170, pp. 108 and 394. 
27
 See also discussion by Dauvergne, 2008, pp. 5 and 49 f., particularly on pp. 50 f. and Dauvergne, C., Making 
People Illegal, in Fitzpatrick, P., Tuitt, P. (Eds.), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2004, pp. 83–99, particularly on p. 86.  
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Globalization 
Turning to the second part of my analysis, increasingly restrictive immigration and refugee 
policies exist in parallel with the free flow of goods, labour, services and capital. As observed 
by de los Reyes and Mulinari, the exploitation of cheap labour, which has given rise to the 
very basis of consumption in the rich world, is no longer tied to specific locations, regions 
and countries. Moreover, globalization has increasingly come to promote political and 
economic elites, while unstable working conditions, supply difficulties and a fragmented life, 
become a reality not only for the poor populations on the periphery, but also for subordinate 
groups in the rich world. Accordingly, global processes cannot be separated from the 
concentration of material and symbolic resources in the western world, for it is this spatial 
redistribution of inequality that gives the nation's imagined community meaning. Perceptions 
of race fill an important role in re-creating boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, that is, 
between those who belong to the nation and are entitled to claim the nation’s prosperity and 
others belonging to other locations and who are, therefore, not entitled. These boundaries are 
even more important when ‘the others’ are no longer distanced in time and space, but force a 
reshuffle in the rich world’s social landscape.28  
As noted by Dauvergne, the effect of globalization has been to shift the line between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ to embrace a new ‘us’ and simultaneously redraw the boundaries of exclusion, such 
that: ‘[t]he seemingly simultaneous arrival of illegal migrants at borders around the world 
[…] fuels the moral panic: ‘we’ the rich are under siege’.29 The intensification of border-
control measures means that there are now greater incentives than ever to attempt to pass 
oneself off as a refugee seeking protection in a prosperous western state. Refugees and 
refugee law are therefore now located at the centre of concern about illegal migration.
30
 In 
line with this, ‘[t]he burden-sharing imperative of refugee law casts refugees as the rich 
(white) man’s burden for the twenty-first century’.31  
                                              
28
 de los Reyes, P., Mulinari, D., Intersektionalitet [Intersectionality], Liber, Malmö 2005, in re-print 2010, pp. 
19 f. 
29
 Dauvergne, 2008, p. 49. 
30
 Dauvergne, 2008, p. 54. 
31
 Dauvergne, 2008, p. 171. 
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The moral panic is also fuelled by the ‘feminization of migration’, which I described earlier. 
This is particularly the case in the face of the expanded role of international human rights. As 
Dauvergne argues, states now have greater incentives to narrow the scope of refugee law. The 
growth of human rights norms is therefore paradoxically linked to states pulling away from 
refugee law commitments.
32
 Together with the abovementioned critique this raises, however, 
the question of whether this politicized area of law is not also ‘special’ as regards the 
Swedish policy of gender equality.  
 
Gender in the Swedish definition of refugee: the 2006 revision 
Thirdly, it is important to look at changes which affect the way in which gender is dealt with 
specifically in the legislation and in practice. The Swedish definition of a refugee is set out in 
Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Aliens Act and is based on article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol.
33
 However, after the revision in 2006 the 
definition, in contrast to the Convention, explicitly covers persecution on account of gender 
or sexual orientation.
34
 This amendment was made in the light of the UNHCR guidelines, but 
it was also made in the light of the European Council Qualification Directive.
35
 The UNCHR 
guidelines are, in comparison to the Directive, not legally binding.
36
 The Commissioner’s 
statements provide, however, legal interpretative guidance for interpretation of the 
                                              
32
 Dauvergne, 2008, pp. 60 f. and 166, particularly on pp. 62 and 64.  
33
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267. 
34
 Art. 1A(2) of the Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines a ‘refugee’ as a person who ‘[…] 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it. […]’ Chapter 4, Section 1, first paragraph of the Aliens Act States that ‘In this 
Act ‘refugee’ means an alien who is outside the country of the alien’s nationality, because he or she feels a well-
founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political belief, or on grounds of gender, 
sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group […].’  
35
 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of 
Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International 
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, OJ L 304, 30.9.2004 pp. 12–23.  
36
 This Directive, applicable to nearly all EU Member States, calls for countries to comply by passing and 
enforcing domestic legislation by October 2006. As regards the implementation of the Directive into Swedish 
law, in addition to the aforementioned changes, further changes have been made, which came into force on 1 
January 2010. See SFS 2009:1542 om ändring i utlänningslagen (2005:716) [Swedish Code of Statutes, Act 
Amending the Aliens Act (2005:716)]. 
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Convention and Protocol.
37
 They also form the basis in many states, including Sweden, for 
recognizing women as constituting a ‘particular social group’ which makes them important 
sources in any analysis of refugee status. Under UNCHR guidelines the category 
‘membership of a particular social group’ cannot be so interpreted as to render the other 
Convention grounds superfluous or as a ‘catch all’ that applies to all persons fearing 
persecution. Thus, to preserve the structure and integrity of the Convention’s definition of a 
refugee, a social group cannot, according to the guidelines, be defined exclusively by the fact 
that it is targeted for persecution.
38
 There is nevertheless no ‘closed list’ of what groups may 
constitute a particular social group. Rather, the term ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of 
groups in various societies and evolving international human rights norms.
39
  
In the last decade it has been more prevalent for some victims of domestic abuse to be 
recognized as Convention refugees on social group grounds. According to one line of 
reasoning recognition is restricted to those cases where the state fails to protect the victims of 
domestic assault because they are women. Another line of reasoning simply finds that women 
who are subjected to domestic violence are persecuted because of their social group (women), 
since their gender is a substantial factor for their persecution.
40
 According to the UNHCR the 
causal link between the persecution and the grounds may be satisfied where there is a real 
risk of the person being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor for reasons related to one 
of the Convention grounds. This is the case where the failure of the State to protect the 
claimant is Convention related, or where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-
                                              
37
 http://www.unhcr.se/en/resources/legal-documents/guidelines-and-positions.html, accessed 7 November 
2011. See also statements in the preamble to the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as 
Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, OJ L 304, 
30.9.2004 pp. 12–23. In Sweden it is established in the preparatory work (Prop. 2004/05:170, p. 94) and in case 
law (MIG 2006:1) that the UNHCR handbook (Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 1979, 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, re-edited in 1992), together with the conclusions that the UNHCR supports, provide 
guidance for application. 
38
 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: ‘Membership of a particular social group’ Within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 
May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01, para 2. About the relation between the category ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ and the other grounds in the Convention, see e. g. Macklin, A., Refugee Women and the Imperative of 
Categories, 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1995, No. 2, pp. 213–277, particularly on pp. 256–263. 
39
 UNHCR, Guidelines on ‘Membership of a particular social group’, para 3. 
40
 See Kelley, N., The Convention Refugee Definition and Gender-Based Persecution: A Decade’s Progress, 13 
International Journal of Refugee Law 2002, No. 4, pp. 559–568, on p. 565, with further references. 
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state actor is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State 
to offer protection is for a Convention reason.
41
 Furthermore it is sufficient that the 
Convention ground is a relevant contributing factor. It need not be shown to be the sole, or 
dominant, cause.
42
 
When the definition in the Geneva Convention was implemented into the Swedish legislation 
it was emphasized that it is ‘important that the refugee determination takes place in a 
generous spirit [my translation].’43 It is, however, also emphasized in the preparatory work 
that we cannot apply the Convention in a way that, irrespective of the direction, would 
deviate from its applications in other countries; the work for harmonization within the 
European Union being particularly important.
44
 The above-mentioned Qualification Directive 
sets minimum standards for refugee status and other forms of international protection for the 
European Union Member States. In some areas the Directive is close or identical to the 
Convention. In key areas, however, there is a tendency to add more detail, narrowing the 
interpretations of the refugee definition.
45
 For example, the Directive, unlike the Refugee 
Convention, defines persecution and it also explicitly recognizes gender-specific forms of 
persecution, including sexual violence (Article 9).  
Furthermore, the Directive provides a definition of ‘a particular social group’ (Article 10). It 
states that persons shall be considered to form a particular social group where members of 
that group share an innate characteristic, a common background that cannot be changed, or a 
characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should 
not be forced to renounce it, and that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country 
                                              
41
 UNHCR, Guidelines on ‘Membership of a particular social group’, para. 23 and UNHCR, Guidelines on 
Gender-Related Persecution, para. 21. According to Edwards the responsiveness of the State in providing 
protection should increase in direct proportion to the vulnerability of the particular individual. If the State would 
take concrete action in the case of a child or a women beaten in the street by a stranger, but does not do so in 
relation to a child or woman subjected to violence at home, it could be determined that the State has withheld 
protection from those citizens. According to her the public/private dichotomy is never more pronounced than in 
these types of cases and is often reflected in the level of protection available to such individuals. See Edwards, 
A., Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law, in Feller, E., Türk, V., Nicholson, F. (Eds.), 
Refugee Protection in International Law, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 46–80, on p. 65.  
42
 See UNHCR, Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 20. 
43
 Prop. 1979/80:96 med förslag till ny utlänningslag, m.m. [Government’s Proposal for a New Aliens Act etc.], 
p. 42.  
44
 Prop. 1996/97:25, Svensk migrationspolitik i globalt perspektiv. [Government’s proposal, Swedish Migration 
Policy in Global Perspective], pp. 96 f. and reference to the statement in Prop. 2004/05:170, p. 172. 
45
 See also Dauvergne, 2008, pp. 149 f. 
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because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. Depending on the 
circumstances in the country of origin, a particular social group might be based on a common 
characteristic of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation cannot be understood to include acts 
considered to be criminal in accordance with the national law of the Member States. Gender-
related aspects might be considered, without themselves alone creating a presumption for the 
applicability of the Article. The Directive has also taken a ‘protection’ position on non-state 
actors (Article 6).  In other words, actors perpetrating persecution or serious harm include (a) 
the State, (b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory 
of the State and non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that these actors (a and b), 
including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide protection. 
Protection is ‘generally provided’ when these actors ‘take reasonable steps to prevent the 
persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by operating an effective legal system for 
the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, 
and the applicant has access to such protection.’ (Article 7) However, as international 
organisations do not have the attributes of a State, in practice their ability to enforce the ‘rule 
of law’ is often very problematic. Hence the position taken in the Directive is more restrictive 
than the UNHCR position, and has therefore been criticized.
46
 
As already pointed out, after the revision in 2006 the definition of refugee in the Swedish 
Aliens Act explicitly covers persecution on account of one’s gender.47 In the Government bill 
it was also established that gender may constitute ‘membership of a particular social group’. 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that persecution in the private sphere may be a basis for 
refugee status. According to the Government, in such cases it is important to consider the 
social structure in the home land and the home state’s willingness and ability to offer 
protection. A person who risks being exposed to persecution by individuals on grounds of 
gender, may in some cases be denied protection in their home country because of the 
prevailing political, social, religious or cultural structures. If the authorities do not offer any 
                                              
46
 See Crawley, H., Lester, T., Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in National Asylum 
Legislation and Practice in Europe, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis Unit, Department of International Protection, and Regional Bureau for Europe, EPAU/2004/05 May 
2004, pp. 59 f., with further references. 
47
 In the Act, the term ‘sex’ is used, referring to biological as well as social sex. See Prop. 2005/06:6, 
Flyktingskap och förföljelse på grund av kön eller sexuell läggning [Government’s Proposal, Refugee Status and 
Persecution on Account of One’s Gender or Sexual Orientation], p. 34. In the English translation of the Swedish 
Act the term ‘sex’ is translated with ‘gender’. See Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Aliens Act. 
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protection and in reality accept the abuse, the woman has no possibility to obtain state 
protection and in such cases she may be regarded as a refugee. Similarly, in some cultures the 
man’s right to exercise power over the woman is an uncontested and fundamental part of the 
social structure, meaning that it is impossible for women to get state protection from 
violence, restrictions on freedom, or honour related reprisals from the men in the family 
circle.
48
 In the investigation that the Government bill is based on there is also a discussion 
about ‘wife-battering’, where it is declared that there may be many reasons for a woman to be 
exposed to serious battering; for instance because she has been unfaithful, or accused of 
being unfaithful – the primary cause or driving force normally being seen to be jealousy. 
According to the investigation, it would be far-fetched to say that the action of the man in 
these cases is due to her ‘membership of a particular social group’. At the same time it was 
observed in a note that in the example given only women are referred to, as ‘in accusations 
about unfaithfulness as a rule it is women who risk being exposed to persecution’ [my 
translation].
49
 Hence, abuse that women are exposed to in the private sphere is construed as 
something that is primarily linked to jealousy. Furthermore, it is clear from the preparatory 
work that in these cases it is also required that the home state’s inability to supply protection 
is not due simply to lack of resources or inefficiency.
50
 This statement in the preparatory 
work has later been referred to in case law concerning a woman from Albania who had been 
exposed to violence by her former husband.
51
 She had turned to the police but got no help and 
sought asylum because she was in danger of being killed by her own and her former 
husband’s family. In this case, persecution sufficient to ground refugee status was considered 
to be in place, as ‘the authorities’ unwillingness to give her protection was due to social and 
cultural structures and the fact that she was a woman’ [my translation]. This is, however, not 
something that is required in non-gender-related cases when persecution is exercised by 
private actors.
52
 Unlike the position in the UNHCR guidelines, it is thus not enough in 
                                              
48
 Prop. 2005/06:6, pp. 25 f. 
49
 SOU 2004:32, Flyktingskap och könsrelaterad förföljelse [Government Commission, Refugee Status and 
Persecution on Account of One’s Gender], p. 126. 
50
 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 28. The Government’s opinion was shared by the Committee on Social Insurance. See 
Bet. 2005/06:SfU4, Förföljelse på grund av kön eller sexuell läggning [Committee on Social Insurance, 
Persecution on Account of One’s Gender or Sexual Orientation], p. 14. 
51
 MIG 2008:39. 
52
 It may be noted that Lars Ohly et al. in a proposal tabled in Parliament (a ‘private member’s bill’), motion Sf1 
yrkande 7, asked for a notification that persecution in the private sphere as grounds for refugee status should be 
handled in accordance with international refugee law and that, in cases involving persecution by e.g. a husband 
which are related to one of the Convention grounds, it should not matter whether or not the failure of the State to 
protect the claimant is Convention-related, as referred to in Bet. 2005/06:SfU4. 
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Swedish law for a woman to be exposed to persecution in the private sphere ‘on account of 
gender’. There is also a requirement that the state’s failure to supply protection is ‘on account 
of gender’. Accordingly, Sweden embraces the more restrictive line of reasoning described 
earlier, among those states that recognize victims of domestic abuse as refugees on social 
group grounds. 
 
Implementing a gender (and gendered) perspective (marked by racism?) 
As already described, as a result of the 2006 revision, the Swedish Aliens Act explicitly 
covers persecution on account of one’s gender. It was also established in the preparatory 
work that gender may constitute ‘membership of a particular social group’ and that 
persecution in the private sphere may be a basis for refugee status. In the investigation that 
the Government bill is based on, however, abuse that women are exposed to in the private 
sphere is construed as something that is primarily concerned with infidelity and jealousy (cf 
‘crime passionnel’). According to the investigation, it would be far-fetched to say that the 
man’s actions in cases of accusations of infidelity are due to the woman’s ‘membership of a 
particular social group’. It is possibly far-fetched to say that the jealousy in these cases is due 
to her ‘membership of a particular social group’, but I am not convinced that the action of the 
man in such cases, i.e. the expressions that the jealousy takes or is ‘allowed’ to take (actions 
available in the situated emotional repertoire), is not due to her ‘membership of a particular 
(subordinate) social group’. For, if one assumes (which the investigation does) that it is 
mainly women who are exposed to such persecution, why then is it men who do the hitting? 
Do women not get jealous? If not, is that related to gender? And, if they do get jealous, why 
do they not hit ‘because of’ it? What is more, if we acknowledge feelings—or the expressions 
they take or are allowed to take (violence) – to be gendered, how can we even differentiate 
between gender (ground) and violence (persecution)? There is no analysis of this in the 
investigation. Yet, the structural abuse of which this persecution is an expression is construed 
as emotional, as individual actions taken for personal reasons, just because it is manifested in 
a family context.  
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The point of departure is obvious: the power structures that are acknowledged elsewhere in 
society are not applicable to relations within the family in this branch of law.
53
 Accordingly, 
a woman who risks abuse from her husband or partner may be excluded from refugee status 
as the persecution that she risks is not defined as being based on ‘membership of a particular 
social group’. Paradoxically, upholding the law’s separation between the subject and the 
persecution in this case means ‘personalizing’ the violence. An analysis of the preparatory 
work thus reveals that the gender perspective implemented in the legislation is also a ‘gender 
biased’ perspective. Hence, the perspective contained in the act not only preserves the 
‘structure and integrity’ of the Convention (the ground/persecution divide), but also the 
power structures in society.
54
 Accordingly, construing ‘violence in the private sphere’ as 
emotional, as individual actions for personal reasons, also means construing it as a ‘social 
problem’, placing not only the responsibility for the protection but also the abuse, on ‘the 
others’.55 The consequence of this construction in law is that many of these women will be 
without protection, since in their home country they are often assigned to their violent men 
for their support and ‘protection’.56 According to the UNHCR, many of these women may 
also be threatened by their own family if they attempt to leave their husband or partner, as it 
may be perceived as ‘dishonouring’ the family.57 In this case, however, when the violence is 
defined as ‘honour related’ or when it appears in a ‘patriarchal society’, it is more likely that 
                                              
53
 Nilsson, 2007, p. 157 and Bexelius, 2001, particularly on p. 186. See also discussion by Spijkerboer, 2005, 
pp. 67–102, particularly on pp. 69, 79 f. and 88. For an analysis of the private/public distinction within 
international refugee law, see Crawley, H., Refugees and Gender—Law and Process, Jordans, Bristol 2001, pp. 
18 f. See also discussion by Kneebone, 2005, particularly on p. 31 f. and 37 f., and  Heyman, M. G., Domestic 
Violence and Asylum: Toward a Working Model of Affirmative State Obligations, 17 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 2005, No. 4, pp. 729–748.   
54
 For further analysis see forthcoming article, Nilsson, E., The ‘Refugee’ and the ‘Nexus’ Requirement. The 
Relation Between the Subject and the Persecution in the United Nations Refugee Convention, Women’s Studies 
International Forum (to be published in 2013). See also discussion about cause/reason and ‘men doing jealousy’ 
by Burman, M., Immigrant Women Facing Male Partner Violence—Gender, Race and Power in Swedish Alien 
and Criminal Law, in same issue. 
55
 In Sweden, an alien who does not meet the criteria for refugee status can also be granted protection as a 
‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ [alternativt skyddsbehövande], in accordance with Council Directive 
2004/83/EC, or according to a wider national definition, as a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’ [övrig 
skyddsbehövande]. Furthermore, a residence permit can be granted on the grounds of ‘exceptionally distressing 
circumstances’ [synnerligen ömmande omständigheter]. According to MIG 2008:13, however, social problems, 
as a rule, should be solved in consultation with the authorities in the home country and not, as a principle, be 
determined as ‘exceptionally distressing circumstances’. 
56
 See also Jastram, K., Newland, K., Family Unity and Refugee Protection, in Feller, E, Türk, V., Nicholson, F. 
(Eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 555–603, on pp. 559 f. 
57
 UNHCR, Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, Geneva 2008, p. 155. 
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the violence will be considered gender-related and will provide favoured access to asylum.
58
 
This is also the case when female genital mutilation is involved.
59
 When the persecution is 
familiar to our own ‘gendered practices’, or when the ‘gendered practices’ are otherwise 
considered too ‘general’, it is not so likely.60 Instead, as pointed out by Freedman, the 
persecutions that take place in those ‘other’ countries are attributed to immutable social and 
cultural characteristics, while the dynamics of gender inequality underlying all types of 
gender-related violence, whether ‘here’ or ‘there’, is not analysed.61 Rather, ‘personalizing’ 
the violence in this case means ‘particularizing’ it, but also ‘culturalizing’ it (and ‘racifying’ 
it as immutable), not identifying it as a ‘universal’ pattern of domination and control.62 The 
contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is therefore reinforced by the fact that the other culture is 
understood as bearing the imprint of patriarchal oppression while our own is understood as 
equal, i.e. perceptions of Swedish gender equality are used to draw a line between ourselves 
and the immigrant population where the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is created with 
                                              
58
 See Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 28; MIG 2008:39; MIG 2011:8. For similar conclusions in international doctrine, see 
e.g. Mascini & van Bochove, 2009, p. 130; Kneebone, 2005, pp. 37 and 41; Spijkerboer, 2002, p. 105. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that a refugee woman’s claim is most likely to succeed if it is a ‘good 
woman’ claim. See Spijkerboer, 2002, p. 103.  
59
 See Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 28 and guiding decision by the Swedish Migration Board, 2008-10-24, Lifos No. 
19649. FGM enters clearly into the category of a ‘good woman’ claim described in note 61, above, as it involves 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘innocent’ victims. This is particularly the case when the victims are young girls. See also 
discussion by Freedman, J., Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From International Norms to 
National Protection?, 48 International Migration 2010, No. 1, pp. 175-198, on p. 190. 
60
 See Nilsson, 2007, p. 161.  
61
 Freedman, 2010, p. 191. See also discussion by Mascini & van Bochove, 2009, p. 130. According to the 
authors the smaller success rate of men has not provoked action so far because it ‘offers policy-makers, interest 
groups, and social scientists fewer opportunities to exemplify the moral superiority of the West in regards to the 
South, than when it concerns the patriarchal domination of women’. 
62
 I use the word ‘universal’ to capture ‘discursive structures’ and ‘hegemony’, i.e. I lay no claim to 
‘universalism’. Instead I believe time and place are central categories in analysing and ‘denaturalizing’ socially 
and historically created inequalities, such as men's violence against women. See de los Reyes, P., Gröndahl, S., 
Introduktion: Framtidens feminismer: Vägar bortom törnrosalandet [Introduction: Future Feminisms: Roads 
Beyond the Land of the Sleeping Beauty], in de Los Reyes, P., Gröndahl, S., Laskar, P., Martinsson, L., 
Rosenberg, T. (Eds.), Framtidens feminismer. Intersektionella interventioner i den feministiska debatten [Future 
Feminisms. Intersectional Interventions in the Feminist Debate], Tankekraft Förlag, Hägersten 2007, pp. 11–22, 
particularly on pp. 14, and de Los Reyes, P., Rosengård är min Shatila!: Hegemoniska berättelser och 
gränsöverskridande erfarenheter [Rosengård is my Shatila!: Hegemonic Narratives and Transnational 
Experiences], in de Los Reyes, P., Gröndahl, S., Laskar, P., Martinsson, L., Rosenberg, T. (Eds.), Framtidens 
feminismer. Intersektionella interventioner i den feministiska debatten [Future Feminisms. Intersectional 
Interventions in the Feminist Debate], Tankekraft Förlag, Hägersten 2007, pp. 101–115, on pp. 101 f.  See also 
Mouffe, C., On the Political, Routledge, New York 2005, particularly on pp. 83 f. and 120 f. For a discussion of 
challenges that an intersectional analysis grounded in a structural framework provides for understanding the role 
of culture in domestic violence, see Sokoloff, N. J., Dupont, I., Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, 
Class, and Gender: Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Marginalised Women in 
Diverse Communities, 11 Violence Against Women 2005, No. 1, pp. 38–64, particularly on p. 58. 
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reference to equality versus oppression of women.
63
 As shown, this ‘culturalization’ in the 
2006 revision of the Aliens Act, through its construction of the abuse as emotional, also 
means ascribing ‘the others’ gendered (immutable and race-related) attributes (feelings), i.e. 
construing them as inferior, irrational and uncivilized.
64
 Hence, gender and race ‘intersect’ in 
the construction of ‘the others’.65 
As has been shown, women who risk abuse from their husbands or partners may be excluded 
from refugee status as the persecution that they risk is not defined as being based on 
‘membership of a particular social group’ (not because she is a woman). Should the abuse 
nevertheless be defined as being ‘on account of gender’, it is also required that the state’s 
inability to supply protection is ‘on account of gender’. It is, in other words, required in 
Swedish law that the persecution is publicly sanctioned, a kind of ‘institutionalized violence’. 
Ironically this demand means that these women are exposed by the Swedish migration 
authorities to such ‘institutionalized violence’ ‘on account of gender’ that would have been a 
basis for refugee status if it had been the authorities in their homeland that had exposed them 
to it. It also constitutes an exception to the ‘rule of law’ principle, defined as ‘uniformity’ and 
‘predictability’, as it implies ‘inequality before the law’ for women seeking refugee status. In 
other words, women from countries that lack resources or countries with an inefficient state 
administration are discriminated against by this requirement in comparison to male victims of 
persecution. For according to the preparatory work it is mainly women – though not because 
they are women – that risk this kind of persecution.  
                                              
63
 de los Reyes, P., Molina, I., Kalla mörkret natt! Kön, klass, och ras/etnicitet i det postkoloniala Sverige [Call 
the Dark Night! Gender, Class and Race/Etnicity in the Postcolonial Sweden], in de los Reyes, P., Molina, I., 
Mulinari, D. (Eds.), Maktens (o)lika förklädnader. Kön, klass och etnicitet i det postkoloniala Sverige: en 
festskrift till Wuokko Knocke 2002 [Power’s (Un)equal Disguises. Gender, Class and Ethnicity in the 
Postcolonial Sweden: a Festschrift to Wuokko Knocke 2002], Bokförlaget Atlas, Stockholm 2006, pp. 303 f.
 
 
64
 For an analysis of how gender ideologies and discourses imbue colonial structures, metaphors and symbolism, 
see de los Reyes & Mulinari 2005, in re-print 2010, p. 68. 
65
 This term, introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw and used in several UN documents related to women’s human 
rights, focuses on the interaction between different power structures. See Crenshaw, K. W., Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, pp. 139–167, on p. 140. See also Crenshaw, K. 
W., Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 
Stanford Law Review 1991, No. 6, pp. 1241–1299. For more recent international literature on ‘intersectionality’, 
see e.g. Lutz, H., Herrera Vivar, M. T., Supik, L. (Eds.), Framing Intersectionality. Debates on a Multi-Faceted 
Concept in Gender Studies, Ashgate, Surrey 2011; Grabham, E., Cooper, D., Krishnadas, J., Herman, D. (Eds.), 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location, Routledge-Cavendish, New York 2009; 
Yuval-Davis, N., Intersectionality and Feminist Politics, 13 European Journal of Women’s Studies 2006, No. 3, 
pp. 193–209; McCall, L., The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 2005, No. 3, pp. 1771–1800. 
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Final remarks  
The preparatory work for the changes made in the Swedish Aliens Act in 2006 concerning 
the definition of refugee was driven by a wish to implement a gender perspective. Yet, as I 
have argued, a closer reading of the preparatory work reveals ‘gender biases’, with many 
asylum-seeking women being discriminated against in comparison to male victims of 
persecution. The reason for this is that the ‘special’ character of migration law rests upon 
demands other than those usually required by the ‘rule of law’. As described, in this area of 
law, the ‘rule of law’ is transformed into ‘speed’ and ‘flexibility’, while ‘uniformity’ and 
‘predictability’ – at least when it comes to women from countries that lack resources or 
countries with an inefficient state administration – is retained as rhetoric.  
Furthermore, it appears that the gender perspective implemented in the act is also marked by 
‘othering mechanisms’ and underlying racism, and it seems it is this racist notion of ‘the 
others’ that is the reason for the limitations in the Act; the risk of having the entire world’s 
oppressed (‘non-white’ and poor) women (and children too for that matter) on ‘our 
threshold’.66 As a result, in this branch of law, domestic violence as a ‘universal’ pattern of 
domination and control is not acknowledged. Instead the violence is construed as ‘private’ or 
‘cultural’, employed to exclude protection. When the persecution is familiar to our own 
‘gendered practices’ or when they are otherwise considered too ‘general’, there is a denial of 
the link between the persecution and the ground for seeking refugee status. However, if the 
‘othering mechanisms’ are strong enough, the violence may qualify as being ‘on account of 
gender’. Hence, sometimes the ‘cultural’ harm is translated into the ‘public’ sphere of 
protection of the Refugee Convention. This is e.g. the case when women (or children) are 
exposed to ‘honour related’ violence or violence appearing in a ‘patriarchal society’ or when 
the application is based on the excision of female genital mutilation. So, in order to be 
considered ‘structural’, the violence must not be ‘familiar’ or ‘general’, but ‘other’. 
                                              
66
 See also discussion by Burman, M., in this issue. 
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Accordingly, in these cases, the effect of ‘culturalization’ is also a trend to ‘exclusionary 
inclusion’.67  
With the exception of this ‘exclusionary inclusion’, ‘ongoing exclusion’ is the key word for 
women in this branch of law. Hence, in migration law ideology the law’s demand for 
(formal) ‘equality before the law’, ‘uniformity’ and ‘predictability’ has meant the 
implementation of new perspectives, while staying with the old assumptions and values; 
taking male experiences as a starting point, privileging the public, excluding the private, i.e. 
an ‘add and stir’ approach.68 Should the abuse be defined as structural (‘on account of 
gender’), then it is, however, also required that the state’s inability to supply protection is ‘on 
account of gender’. With or without the ‘rule of law’, it seems gender equality is not a 
favoured issue. Accordingly, under the threat of masses of asylum-seekers crossing our 
borders, there are very limited possibilities for taking gender into account, as globalization 
and the feminization of asylum-seekers increases this threat. It is particularly the case if ‘we’ 
revise our self-image as a good and equality producing state and acknowledge that it is not 
only ‘the other’ women (and children) that are being oppressed. Holding on to international 
refugee law may from this perspective seem impossible, applying it in a ‘generous spirit’ 
even less possible. Taking the human rights of these women seriously in our own ‘non-
refugee producing states’ may, however, work as an incentive for ‘us’ to also seriously 
commit to the development of welfare and human rights in ‘refugee-producing states’; 
making these women a responsibility not only of the ‘others’ but of ourselves.69 There are 
therefore reasons for problematizing time and the role of history when it comes to the 
creation of meaning and legitimacy in an unfair world order. A discourse which displaces the 
issue onto other times and places has been conducive to hiding the way living conditions for 
‘the others’ in the poor world have been a precondition for the welfare of ‘us’ in the rich 
                                              
67
 See also analysis of the Australian law and policy by Kneebone, 2005, pp. 8, 22 f. and 40. 
68
 The expression ‘add women and stir’ is used by Charlesworth and Chinkin concerning the development of 
international criminal law in the 1990s. See Charlesworth, H., Chinkin, C., The Boundaries of International 
Law: A Feminist Analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2000, p. 335. 
69
 See also description by Yttergren, Å., in this issue, about the two principles that are central to development 
assistance in Sweden: a poor people’s perspective and a human rights perspective. 
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world.
70
 Building welfare for the ‘rich (white) man’, casts a burden on the ‘poor (black) 
woman’. It is pay-back time.  
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